Welcome to the VA/EE - newsletter about nuclear security in Russia, Russia’s impact on nuclear security globally, and lessons from Russia’s experience for nuclear security elsewhere.
Nuclear security is a broad term and different audiences assume different concepts when discussing nuclear security. For this newsletter “nuclear security” mostly includes issues related to threats of theft of nuclear materials and radioactive substances to use them for nuclear explosive device or dirty bomb and sabotage against these materials and facilities, where they are handled, as well as protection from these threats.
VA/EE stands for ”vulnerability assessment and effectiveness evaluation”. These are key processes in designing, maintaining, and operating nuclear security system for specific nuclear site. Vulnerability assessment (VA) implies the determination of vulnerable points of the nuclear site, threats to nuclear materials and sites, and consequences of malign actions. VA serves as a basis for designing a protection system. Effectiveness evaluation (EE) is a process aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of a protection system, i.e. its ability to protect nuclear material and site against the threat determined during VA. As threats change, a nuclear site must do VA and EE regularly to make sure protection is adequate to evolving threats to facilitate a continuous improvement process. In the United States effectiveness evaluation is part of the formal vulnerability assessment process, while in Russia these are two distinct although closely intertwined processes. Participants of the past nuclear security cooperation between Russia and the United States are very familiar with the ”VA and EE” acronym.
In this newsletter, I will go further and apply key principles of VA and EE to the analysis of nuclear security regime in general, which is not limited to nuclear security systems at specific sites but covers national and global efforts and infrastructure aimed at preventing nuclear security accidents or responding to them if they happen.
Nuclear security in Russia is the core of my experience. Most of my other professional interests, including some without an obvious connection to nuclear security, grew from my Russian experience. My first post explains, why I believe it is important to talk about Russia and nuclear security now when Russia is grabbing global attention due to the war in Ukraine.
Who Am I?
I have 25 years of experience as a consultant supporting the development of national nuclear security infrastructure in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, as well as an independent researcher covering nuclear security topics. When people have questions about nuclear security in Russia they often call me.
I wrote a chapter on “The Evolution of Nuclear Security in Russia” for The Oxford Handbook of Nuclear Security. Read it, if you need a quick introduction to or brief overview of nuclear security in Russia.
Center for Nonproliferation Studies included the article “Nuclear Security in Russia: Can Progress Be Sustained?” I co-authored with Matthew Bunn in its list of essential reading on Russia and weapons of mass destruction.
Stanley Center published my personal reflection on my professional experience supporting the development of nuclear security infrastructure in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus as part of their collection of stories describing Adventures in Nuclear Risk Reduction.
More details about my experience and a complete list of publications are available on my LinkedIn profile.
I was born in Russia and lived there most of my life. I left with my family shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine due to an array of ethical, personal, and professional reasons. We spent some time in Turkey and Georgia before moving to Israel ten days before the Hamas attack.
What to Expect
I hope this newsletter will be valuable for readers interested in nuclear security regardless of their experience and professional background. I explained nuclear security technology and processes to political scientists and international relations students, trained Americans in Russian nuclear security regulations, and facilitated joint work of lawyers and engineers to solve nuclear security problems. From my experience working with different audiences, I learned that people overestimate the ease of understanding between different professional or national cultures. You often need to explain things that seem obvious to make sure your counterpart understands you. I will strive to write about complex nuclear security topics in a way that is easy for all readers to understand. If I fail, please do not hesitate to ask a question – there are no “stupid” questions. However, if you are up to a detailed and nuanced discussion of nuclear security, let me know too - I will also be glad to entertain you.
I am planning to make two weekly posts. One of them will provide an overview of the current developments. Second will provide a detailed analysis of a selected topic or explain the nuclear security element or concept applicable to Russia.
This newsletter will be completely free until at least I establish a decent publication routine. If you like the newsletter please share it with other readers.
