Russia and Nuclear Security – Too Big to Ignore
Why talk Russia and nuclear security now?
It is challenging to start a newsletter on nuclear security in Russia and Russia’s role in global nuclear security when Russia draws attention due to its invasion of Ukraine. Besides other damage, this war puts at risk many nuclear facilities in Ukraine and shakes the international nuclear security regime affecting facilities well beyond the war territory. There might be a temptation – and risk – to stop talking to Russia at all, letting it loose and giving up attempts to influence its behavior. The reality is, however, Russia’s impact on nuclear security is complex and multifaceted and this impact is just too big to ignore. Ignoring can lead to a catastrophe. Watching and engaging to the extent possible can help prevent potentially catastrophic nuclear security accidents and deterioration of the global nuclear security regime, influence Russia’s actions, and improve nuclear security globally by leveraging Russian resources and contributing to the improvement of nuclear security in Russia.
There are three key areas where Russia has a substantial impact on nuclear security.
NUCLEAR SECURITY RISKS OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE
The war between Russia and Ukraine creates many risks to nuclear security, including immediate damage to nuclear facilities, disruptions in control over nuclear facilities and materials on affected territories, and challenges to the global nuclear security regime.
Russian aggression involves the occupation of major nuclear facilities – Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) was occupied immediately after the Russian invasion started on February 24, 2022, and vacated by Russian forces on March 31, 2022, and Zaporizhzhya NPP was occupied on March 4, 2022, and is still occupied by Russia. Several other nuclear facilities in Ukraine experienced attacks, including shelling and disruptions of power supply. On the other hand, in late October 2023, Russia also reported three Ukrainian drones in the vicinity of Kursk NPP in the South of Russia, one of which exploded causing minor damage to the facade of the building where spent nuclear fuel is stored, and several Ukrainian drones attacks in early 2024 – reaching as far as St. Petersburg – demonstrated that many Russian nuclear facilities are within the reach of Ukrainian attacks. These attacks highlight potential risks to nuclear facilities due to ongoing hostilities.
As a result of the annexation of Crimea in 2014, as well as the occupation of Eastern Ukraine in 2022, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could not implement safeguards at several Ukrainian nuclear sites and locations outside of facilities subject to safeguards. The establishment of Donetsk and Luhansk “People’s Republics” (DNR and LNR) in the East of Ukraine in 2014 and its occupation in 2022 resulted in Ukraine losing control over the inventory of radioactive sources and waste there. These developments raise questions about the application of the IAEA safeguards, as well as the continuity of control over radioactive substances and waste in Eastern Ukraine.
In addition to the immediate effects of war on nuclear facilities, Russia’s actions raised broader issues related to the future of the nuclear security regime, in particular, risks to nuclear facilities during the war between states or intrastate military conflict. War in Ukraine is the first time, that a major nuclear facility became the object of military attack. While Ukrainian nuclear facilities were not immediate targets of Russian invasion, they were put at risk by military actions around them. At some point, the IAEA also confirmed the presence of Russian military vehicles and equipment at Zaporizhzhya NPP, including some of it in NPP turbine halls. Such use of nuclear facilities can interfere with their operations and raise questions from the standpoint of international humanitarian law.
I will cover the nuclear security dimension of the war in Ukraine in the dedicated post next week.
RUSSIA’S CONTRIBUTION TO NUCLEAR SECURITY GLOBALLY
Despite massive sanctions, Russia still maintains substantial international nuclear cooperation, including cooperation on issues related to nuclear security.
Russia conducted several training courses under the aegis of the IAEA on topics related to nuclear security in 2023, including physical protection of nuclear sites and implementation of safeguards at uranium enrichment plants.
Russia continues multiple projects to build Russian-design NPPs and nuclear research centers in other countries. These projects often include the development of physical protection systems for new nuclear sites, as well as support in developing national nuclear security infrastructure, such as regulations, inspection capabilities, and personnel training. While individual countries (e.g. Finland) have already made decisions to terminate their nuclear cooperation with Russia and sanctions on nuclear fuel trade with Russia are considered in the United States, most of Russia’s partners do not support sanctions, instead interested in continuing nuclear energy cooperation. This provides Russia with substantial influence over nuclear security in recipient states.
Russia played a substantial role in responding to and mitigating the consequences of the Fukushima catastrophe. If there is a nuclear security accident Russia’s expertise and resources might be needed for response and mitigation efforts.
As if you need another evidence of the complexity of today’s World, Russia’s behavior in these areas remains constructive. (Rosatom’s “foreign policy” deserves additional analysis against the backdrop of Russian foreign policy in general). We do not want to throw the baby of Russian nuclear security cooperation with the water of old policy towards Russia.
NUCLEAR SECURITY IN RUSSIA
Russia still maintains a vast nuclear complex and holds the World’s largest stocks of weapons-usable nuclear materials. There is substantial evidence that Russia maintains the security of nuclear materials and sites now without outside funding and technical support, although the economic, political, and security situation in Russia can evolve to decrease Russia’s capability to provide for nuclear security. The international community is interested that Russian nuclear facilities and weapons-usable nuclear materials are properly secured. Nuclear explosive device made from nuclear material stolen in a specific country can detonate elsewhere. Radioactive contamination resulting from catastrophic consequences of the act of sabotage against nuclear facility can spread across borders and the negative effect on the nuclear industry will be global.
WATCH AND ENGAGE WHEN POSSIBLE
The three areas outlined above provide sufficient motivation to watch nuclear security in Russia and Russia’s impact on nuclear security elsewhere and try to engage to the extent possible to influence Russia’s behavior.
While Russia itself initiated the termination of cooperation in nuclear security after 2014, thus, indicating a lack of substantial interest in it, this cooperation has historically been seen by many as benefiting Russia. Hence, attempts to maintain and reinvigorate engagement now might look like acceptance of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, including the occupation of nuclear and radiation facilities.
However, engagement does not necessarily mean accepting or normalizing, what Russia does now. The range of definitions for “engagement” varies from “a mutual promise to marry” to “an actual instance of active hostilities in any situation of conflict”. We face the difficult challenge of finding the right balance and engaging for the benefit of nuclear security while keeping Russia responsible for aggression.
The development and maintenance of an effective nuclear security system include two key processes – vulnerability assessment (VA) and effectiveness evaluation (EE). VA is intended to determine vulnerable elements of the nuclear site, threats to these vulnerable elements, and consequences of malign actions against them. VA serves as a basis for designing a protection system, as you look to protect your vulnerabilities against threats. EE is a process aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of a protection system, i.e. its ability to protect vulnerabilities against threats determined during VA and prevent consequences of malign actions. As threats change, a nuclear site must do VA and EE regularly to make sure protection is adequate to evolving threats and facilitate a continuous protection system improvement process. Applying this framework to the nuclear security regime, Russia can be a threat, a vulnerability, or part of a solution. Obviously, the latter is what we are interested in.
With this newsletter, I seek to inform the discussion and contribute to the quest for constructive engagement with Russia on nuclear security.