Russia’s war in Ukraine affects the protection of nuclear facilities across Russia
Nuclear sites pro-force personnel is depleted due to mobilization
Russia’s war against Ukraine gives another reason to talk about nuclear security. The unexpected Ukrainian Army’s cross-border incursion into Russia’s Kursk Region starting on August 6, 2024, raised concerns about the security of the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (Kursk NPP), located in the town of Kurchatov, approximately 70 km from the Ukrainian border. While it appears that there is no immediate threat to the NPP, information that became available during this incursion justifies concerns about the security of nuclear facilities across Russia in general.
The Kursk NPP has two RBMK-1000 reactors in operation, two RBMK-1000 reactors in shutdown, and two VVER-1300 reactors under construction. Compared to VVER reactors, the design of RBMK reactors and buildings containing them makes them more vulnerable to external damage, such as shelling.
The Ukrainian Army did not advance close to the Kursk NPP (for the status as of the evening of August 13, 2024, see, for example, an update from the Institute for the Study of War) and has not yet directly attacked it. Individual groups were detected 30-40 km from the NPP. On August 9, 2024, Russia reported that “fragments and remnants – presumably, pieces of intercepted rockets – were discovered at the territory of the plant, including in the area of the radioactive waste processing complex.” According to the Russian statement, “So far, there were no recorded facts of direct shelling of the town of Kurchatov, of the NPP and of the energy infrastructure facilities. However, the situation in the town and at the plant remains tense.”
Russian investigative journalism media, referring to the interview with one of the Kursk NPP employees, reported that air defense units were moved closer to the NPP immediately after the incursion and are “constantly shooting back.” They also reported that the National Guard units protecting the NPP are only staffed with women, as all the men were [earlier – VA/EE] sent to the war. The National Guard later reported that additional forces were moved to the NPP.
While I cannot confirm or refute this information, it is consistent with the Russian practice of securing nuclear sites, as well as with what we know about Russia’s approach to the war.
According to Russian legislation, nuclear sites can be protected by the National Guard troops or agency protection forces (pro-forces) reporting to a specific Government agency. The National Guard has dedicated units responsible for the protection of critical infrastructure sites, including nuclear. The list of sites subject to mandatory protection by the National Guard is approved by the Government. Rosatom has its own pro-force organization – Atomguard. Most of the Russian nuclear sites are jointly protected by the National Guard and Atomguard. The National Guard protects the outside perimeter and provides off-site response forces in case of emergencies. The Atomguard staff serves at posts within the site. Pro-force infrastructure must be provided by the site. The work of the National Guard troops is paid from the federal budget, while the work of the Atomguard is paid by the site on a contractual basis. The National Guard troops are essentially military organizations with appropriate arms and training. The Atomguard has lighter arms and training appropriate to provide physical security to property and cargo but not to fight heavily armed adversaries.
Pro-forces at a nuclear site, including both the National Guard and the Atomguard, are staffed and trained to protect against the limited design basis threat determined during the vulnerability assessment. They are not intended to protect against threats typical of armed conflict. Such threats must be addressed by state-wide defense capabilities, such as an army (for useful discussion on the issue of sharing responsibility for protection of the nuclear site between an operator and a state, see Chapters 6-7 in Vitaly Fedchenko’s article on nuclear security during armed conflict). It seems obvious that during the war, the protection of the nuclear facilities that are close to the border with the adversary state should be enhanced. Instead, there is evidence that pro-forces at Russian nuclear sites are depleted as a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
According to its statutory documents, the National Guard is not supposed to take part in combat operations during the war; this responsibility belongs to the Army. However, there are multiple evidence of the National Guard’s participation in the war, which leads to the distraction of staff from its regular responsibilities. According to the rather conservative evaluation of confirmed Russian losses during the war conducted continuously jointly by Mediazona and BBC News Russian Service, as of the end of July 2024, the National Guard lost 559 servicemen, including 135 officers. The actual death count is likely substantially higher. Even more, there is evidence of the Atomguard, Rosatom’s pro-force organization, staff participation in the war.
Most military and quasi-military organizations in Russia, including organizations responsible for protecting nuclear sites, are expected to send their staff to war on a volundatory basis. In addition to the immediate depletion of their staff, this process also decreases the attractiveness of work in these organizations because of the risks of being sent to war.
At the same time, terrorist acts in Moscow in March 2024 and in Dagestan in June 2024 that resulted in at least 162 dead and close to 600 injured highlight the terrorism threat, including terrorism against nuclear sites. The Moscow terrorist act, in particular, revealed substantial problems with prevention and response.