Russian Nuclear Security Update #4
ISIS suspect in Akkuyu; new TID guide from Rostechnadzor; Russia can't confirm drone attacks at ZNPP; licensing waiver for occupied radiation sites; prospects for floating NPP in Africa
Welcome to the new issue of weekly updates on current developments related to nuclear security in Russia, Russia’s impact on nuclear security globally, and lessons for nuclear security elsewhere.
Last week, Turkish police arrested a Russian national with ties to ISIS working at the construction site of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant. No information about the potential intentions of the suspect is available, but this case highlights threats to nuclear sites located close to areas with substantial terrorist activities.
TURKISH POLICE ARREST AN ISLAMIC STATE SUSPECT WHO WORKED AT AKKUYU NPP
February 13, 2024
The suspect is a Russian national working at the Akkuyu NPP under false identity papers. The suspect was brought before a court and jailed pending trial. He was targeted by police in Mersin province, where Akkuyu NPP is located, as a part of a counter-terrorism operation to detain those connected to the Islamic State (ISIS) and responsible for shooting at the Italian Santa Maria Catholic Church in Istanbul in January.
ROSTECHNADZOR ISSUES A GUIDE FOR THE USE OF TAMPER-INDICATING DEVICES IN MC&A SYSTEMS
February 14, 2024
Rostechnadzor, a Russian nuclear regulatory body, issued “Recommendations for using Tamper-Indicating Devices in the System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials.” These recommendations, RB-098-23, are a safety/security guide. These guides are issued by Rostechnadzor to facilitate compliance with mandatory requirements established in Federal Norms and Rules. Operators can use a safety/security guide as an “easy way” to confirm compliance during licensing and inspections – following the guide automatically means compliance. Alternatively, operators can use their own way to comply with mandatory requirements. In this case, they need to justify this alternative method during licensing. RB-098-23 facilitates compliance with provisions of Federal Norms and Rules NP-030-29 Basic Rules for Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material (also known by its Russian acronym OPUK). NP-030-29 establishes mandatory requirements for the use of tamper-indicating devices (seals) in nuclear materials accounting and control systems.
RUSSIA CAN NOT CONFIRM THE ALLEGED DRONE ATTACKS AT ZAPORIZHZHYA NPP AND ENERHODAR
In last week's update, I wrote about Russia’s alleged suppression of 342 “aerial vehicles launched by Ukraine with the aim of attacks and provocations against ZNPP and the town of Enerhodar.” In its new Note Verbale sent to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on February 15, 2024, Russia informed about an additional 95 aerial vehicles suppressed between February 6 and 12. The IAEA update published on February 16, 2024, notes that the Agency experts requested access and went to Enerhodar on February 15, hours after the plant informed them that four drone attacks took place there the previous afternoon. The experts were escorted to two of the four alleged attack sites. They observed damages but did not observe any remnants of the drones that had reportedly been removed. Experts could not confirm whether the damage observed was directly related to drone attacks the previous day, or is the result of damage sustained previously.
In the same Note Verbale Russia informed that Rostechnadzor conducted an inspection to verify compliance with the requirements for accounting and control of nuclear material in material balance areas of all six ZNPP power units.
RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT ISSUED LICENSING WAIVERS FOR RADIATION SITES IN OCCUPIED AREAS OF UKRAINE
January 31, 2024
Russian Government issued a decree that establishes “Peculiarities of Applying Russian Federation Legislation in the Area of Atomic Energy Use on the Territories of Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), Lugansk People’s Republic (LNR), Zaporizhzhya Region and Kherson Region.” This document established several licensing waivers that do not apply to ZNPP but apply to sites handling radioactive substances and waste. These waivers allow organizations that obtained licenses from authorities of Ukraine or DNR and LNR before September 30, 2022, to continue working under these licenses until January 1, 2028. Applicants for new licenses are exempted from paying licensing fees and can provide a reduced package of documentation. They still have to provide documents confirming their compliance with requirements for physical protection, materials control, and accounting applicable to all license applicants in Russia.
LIMITED POTENTIAL FOR FLOATING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN AFRICA
February 9, 2024
PIR Center, a Russian NGO conducting research in the areas of international security, non-proliferation, and nuclear energy, published an analysis on the feasibility of floating nuclear power plants (FNPP) use in Africa. Based on the analysis of specifics and costs of operation of currently available FNPP design, the author (who wears two hats of lecturer at Moscow Engineering Physics Institute and project manager at TENEX, Rosatom’s foreign trade organization) concludes that FNPP projects in Africa must meet the following criteria:
- The proximity of energy consumers to the coastline.
- Demand limited to the period of several decades
- Demand sufficient for the operation of 2-3 FNPPs
- Lack of possibility of using fossil fuel or renewable power generation to eliminate competition
- Acceptability of relatively high cost of produced energy
- Capabilities to ensure security and safety
Potential users meeting such criteria may include mining projects with high added value.