Russian Nuclear Security Update #23
Drone and missile attack drills; 12th GUMO in Ukraine; IAEA inspects Belarus; Russian measurement equipment; 90% enriched SNF removed from submarines base; Russia out of Gen-IV.
Russian nuclear sites take part in country-wide exercises to respond to aerial threats.
Rosatom nuclear sites took part in country-wide exercises to practice response to aerial threats held on October 3-4, 2024. Mining and Chemical Combine and Chepetsk Metallurgy Plant, nuclear fuel cycle enterprises, practiced response to drone attacks against nuclear sites and nuclear materials transport. VNIITF, one of Russia’s nuclear weapon laboratories, practiced response to missile strikes in the region (but not at the nuclear site).
12th GUMO provides personnel for war in Ukraine.
The newsfeed of the 12th GUMO, the Russian Ministry of Defence organization in charge of maintaining nuclear weapons, contains multiple notions of its personnel being on “a mission outside of the permanent duty station.” This hints at the 12th GUMO personnel’s involvement in the war in Ukraine. While accurate information about the nature of the mission is not available, there is indirect evidence suggesting non-combat missions, such as demining, engineering support, and protection of critical infrastructure sites. This distracts 12th GUMO personnel from its primary mission of ensuring the safety and security of Russian nuclear weapons. For more on the potential risks of the war in Ukraine for the security of Russian nuclear weapon sites, read William Moon’s recent article in Foreign Affairs.
The IAEA inspected the inventory of nuclear materials in Belarus.
November 20, 2024
The IAEA conducted inspections of Belarusian nuclear sites under the Safeguards Agreement between the Agency and Belarus. The IAEA conducted a physical inventory of nuclear materials and inspected accounting documentation at the Belarusian NPP and Joint Institute for Power and Nuclear Research – Sosny.
Russia attempts to replace imported nuclear materials measurement equipment.
November 21, 2024
NPO Tsentrotech, Rosatom’s instrument-making enterprise, completed acceptance testing for the prototype mass spectrometer. In 2025, the prototype mass-spectrometer will undergo trial operations at the Electrochemical Plant, one of Rosatom’s uranium enrichment enterprises. It will then be included in the measurement equipment registry to allow its use in nuclear materials measurements. Serial production is expected to start in 2026. Mass spectrometers are a key element of nuclear materials accounting systems. Many Russian nuclear sites still use imported mass spectrometers supplied under the U.S.-Russian nuclear security cooperation.
November 18, 2024
A workshop on spectrometry analysis at Rosatom Technical Academy discussed the prospects for domestic production of high-purity germanium, a critical material for nuclear material detection sensors used in various nuclear security applications. Rosatom’s Science and Technology Council will decide on the project in 2025.
Rosatom removed 90%-enriched spent nuclear fuel from Gremikha Naval Base.
December 2, 2024
Rosatom reported the removal of all 90%-enriched uranium-beryllium spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from the Gremikha Naval Base. SNF was sent to Mayak for reprocessing. This nuclear fuel was used in liquid metal coolant reactors to propel a limited series of nuclear submarines between 1962 and 1997. A total of 11 such reactors were manufactured – 9 for use in submarines (7 submarines with one reactor and one submarine with two reactors) and two reactors for full-scale mockup stands at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering in Obninsk and Alexandrov Institute in the Leningrad Region. Gremikha Naval Base was the only base equipped to handle these reactors. A rather informative video about the unloading process is available here in Russian.
Generation IV Forum will no longer include Russia.
December 6, 2024
The US and UK, at COP29 in Baku, signed the new framework agreement to allow Generation IV International Forum (GIF) to continue working after the current agreement expires in February. The new agreement will no longer include Russia, “ensuring future collaborations remain among mutually willing parties who respect nuclear safety norms.” This happens in apparent response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine that put at risk the safety and security of multiple nuclear sites. GIF was established in 2001 as a cooperative international endeavor seeking to develop the research necessary to test the feasibility and performance of fourth-generation nuclear systems and to make them available for industrial deployment by 2030.